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Aesthetics, Ethics, and the Meaning of Place
I
T h ere  are m any reasons for distinguishing aesthetics and  ethics from  
each o th er, b u t the m ost obvious ones are probably historical. T he tradition 
stem m ing from  B aum garten  and  K ant largely un d ersto o d  aesthetics in  the 
original G reek sense o f the word: aisthanomai, to perceive or sense. Aesthetics 
is prim arily  a m atte r o f  the senses, especially the ‘h igher senses’, seeing and  
hearing. Ethics is concerned  with principles distinguishing morally acceptable 
actions from  im m oral ones, o r setting standards for a good life. Aesthetics 
deals with m atters tha t are som ehow  m ore vague and indefin ite than  ethical 
prob lem s, an d  aesthetics is, indeed , based on som ething less reliable and 
p e rm a n e n t -  the  senses -  com pared  to ethics w here reason and  ra tional 
justifications seem  to have a g reater role. This has con tribu ted , no  doubt, 
to the  evaluation an d  ran k in g  o f them  in philosophy: aesthetics has been  
seen as the least im p o rtan t field, com ing well behind  the m ore sophisticated 
an d  w ell-grounded fields o f  epistem ology and ethics. T hese distinctions and 
th e ir  v a lid ity  have b e e n  q u e s t io n e d ,1 an d  th e re  have b een  n u m ero u s 
argum ents an d  attem pts to establish, for exam ple, the cognitive function o f 
art, H ans-G eorg G ad am er’s being  one o f the m ost well-known.2 However, 
the  ways we th ink  ab o u t aesthetics and  ethics are still strongly m arked by 
this trad ition .
I do  n o t w ant to question  the rationale o f these divisions; I do  th ink  
tha t we n eed  a distinction betw een aesthetic and ethical issues to m ake m ore 
sen se  o f  o u r  w o rld . In  th is  p a p e r  I c o n s id e r  an a re a  c ru c ia l to  o u r  
u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  ou rse lves an d  o u r  p o sitio n  in th e  w orld  w here  th e  
d istinction becom es n o t only problem atic b u t disappears altogether. In  our 
everyday dea lings w ith th e  su rro u n d in g s we have m ade o u r own we are 
within a sphere that exemplifies how both aesthetic and ethical issues overlap
1 See Wolfgang Welsch, Undoing Aesthetics (London: Sage Publications, 1997), translated 
by Andrew Inkpin, 60-102.
2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method ( London: Sheed & Ward, 1989), second, 
revised edition, translation revised byjoel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 81- 
100.
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to a significant degree. All this comes together in the co n cep t o f  place. Place 
u nderstood  in  the sense o f a p e rso n ’s m ean ingfu l an d  significant location  
b rings to g e th er aesthetics an d  ethics. W h en  living in  a p lace  -  o r  m o re  
existentially, when living a place -  we are  ro o ted  to o u r su rro u n d in g s  in 
such a way tha t bo th  o u r aesthetic an d  m oral ju d g em en ts  are d e te rm in e d  
by the d eep  ties th a t we have developed . I t is because  o f  this ex isten tia l 
foundation  that the distinction betw een aesthetic an d  eth ical aspects o f  life 
tends to disappear. In certain areas o f life, b u t n o t in all, beauty and  goodness 
com e together.
I shall first delineate a short existential account o f the concepts o f ‘p lace’ 
and  ‘w orld ’ o r ‘life w orld ’. I call my a c c o u n t ‘e x is ten tia l’ b ecau se  I am  
interested  in the structures o f the life world, and  the life w orld is d e te rm in ed  
by hum an existence and its structures. T he ‘existentials’3 o f h u m an  existence 
are also the  structures o f o u r life world. T h e  h e rm en eu tic  circle o f  h u m an  
and  world, o r  h um an  and  history, m eans th a t we as h u m an  beings a re  also 
d e term ined  by the world.4 T he interw eaving o f h u m an  an d  w orld is o n e  o f 
my s ta r tin g  p o in ts , an d  it c rea te s  th e  o n to lo g ic a l fo u n d a tio n  fo r  my 
u nd erstan d in g  o f aesthetics, ethics and  th e ir role in h u m an  existence.
My em phasis will be in env ironm enta l issues in  a b ro ad  sense. I am  
in terested  in the hum an environm ent, includ ing  art, the bu ilt env ironm ent, 
a n d  to  so m e  e x te n t  th e  n a tu ra l  e n v iro n m e n t.  I sh a ll d iscu ss  so m e  
c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  my a c c o u n t fo r  o u r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  h u m a n  
environm ent, bu t I shall n o t go into issues such as ecology, conservation  and  
restoration.
I I
Let m e begin with the concepts o f  ‘cu ltu re ’ an d  ‘trad itio n ’. T hese  are 
crucial term s in u n d e rs tan d in g  w hat is m e a n t by w orld  o r by life w orld. 
Historicity and  trad ition  are g rou n d in g  ideas in h erm en eu tics  an d  figure 
prom inently  in G adam er’s thinking. For H eidegger, the h e rm en eu tic  circle 
was existential in nature in the sense tha t the h um an  way o f being, existence, 
was characterised  by a ‘fo re-understand ing ’ o f Being in  gen era l.5 To grasp
3 Martin Heidegger introduces the notion of the ‘existential’, ‘ein E xisten zia l' to 
distinguish his ideas from Kantian categories. Macquarrie and Robinson translate the 
term as ‘existentiale’ (pi. ‘existentialia’), Being an d  Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 70 
and 79, but this is somewhat clumsy. See Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1979), 44 and 54.
4 See Heidegger, B ein gand Time, 424-449; Gadamer, op. cit., 254-264.
5 See Heidegger, op. cit., 358-364; Gadamer, op. cit., 265-271.
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B eing in general we m ust study hum an existence, and this is what H eidegger 
does in Being and Time. For G adam er, the question is m ore ‘m u n d an e’: the 
ro le  o f  h istoricity  in u n d erstan d in g  in the hum anities, an d  the im portance 
o f  t ra d it io n  in  h u m a n  life. G ad am er criticizes the  E n lig h te n m e n t fo r 
neg lec ting  the  role o f  history and  for operating  with the  concep t o f  pure, 
non-h istorical reason , and  h e  goes so far as to make m orals also relative to 
a  tradition:
T hat which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an 
authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by 
the fact that the authority of what has been handed down to us -  and 
not just what is clearly grounded -  always has power over our attitudes 
and behaviour. ... The real force of morals, for example, is based on 
tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free 
insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition: 
the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe 
this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification 
that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines 
our institutions and attitudes.1’
I shall n o t take a stance on  the question o f w hether all m oral principles 
a re  based  only  on  trad itio n  o r w h e th e r they have a m ore  fu n d am en ta l 
justification , be it ra tio n a l o r  otherw ise. But w hen we com e to aesthetic 
p ro b lem s, th e n , I th in k , we are firm ly on  a h isto rical fo u n d a tio n . O u r 
a e s th e tic  c u ltu re  -  o u r  p rac tices  w ith in  the  arts as well as ju d g e m e n ts  
co n cern in g  the aesthetic value o f o u r environm ent — has gained its p resen t 
form  d u rin g  the course o f history. T here  would not be any aesthetic culture 
w ithou t its trad ition , an d  if its tradition  had  been  d ifferen t, o u r aesthetic 
cu ltu re  w ould also be d ifferent. O ur aesthetic culture is structured  in certain 
ways and  q u ite  com plex, with a nu m b er o f contrasting tendencies.
It is also time tha t m akes a cultural practice possible and  guaran tees its 
existence. T h e  lon g er a trad ition  is, the stronger it is. A tradition  always has 
the  tendency  to m ultiply itself by producing  objects and  events o f the same 
k ind  an d  creating  new practices around  itself. This m eans that the structures 
are fu r th e r s tren g th en ed  an d  their existence is taken m ore and  m ore for 
g ran ted . H ere , ‘the  test o f  tim e’ m eans that time justifies the existence o f 
ce rta in  practices as well as objects and  events tha t go with it; there  are no 
timeless criteria  which w ould constitute the test and  th rough  which different 
objects an d  events w ould have to pass. T here  is no  logic beyond tim e that 
w ould provide an  exp lanation  and  a rationale for the p resen t state o f affairs.
O nce th ere  is a tradition  its structures are always the basis for new things 
to com e. B ut in the developm ent o f the W estern artw o rld , there can occur
0 Gadamer, ibid., 280-281.
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strands a t certain times in history which go very m uch against o f the tradition. 
This is w hat m any avant-garde m ovem ents have d o n e . A g en e ra l theo ry  
canno t explain  why these sorts o f developm ents take place, o r  why m any 
o th e r  d iffe re n t k inds o f  d ev e lo p m en ts  take p lace . We have to  re fe r  to 
particu lar circum stances -  econom ic, religious, social -  an d  to p articu la r 
individuals living and  m aking decisions in  these circum stances.
T he H eideggerian  ideas o f the  re la tedness o f  B eing in  g en e ra l an d  
hum an existence could be applied to clarify the relationship  betw een cultural 
structures and  an individual living within them . T he Sein, being, in o u r Dasein, 
there-being, is form ed by the d iffe ren t cu ltu ra l structures in to  w hich we are 
born . O ne  o f the ‘sites’ (das Da) which we in h ab it is the aesthetic  cu ltu re . 
T he way we exist in o u r aesthetic cu lture , th a t is, w hat we as h u m an  beings 
in  the existential sense are as far as aesthetic  m atters are co n cern ed , is set 
by constituen ts o f tha t culture. We have an  ‘aesthetic n a tu re ’ o f a certa in  
kind because we were ‘throw n in to ’7 an  aesthetic cu ltu re  o f a ce rta in  kind. 
O ne o f the  existentials o f ou r existence is the ‘aesthetic  ex is ten tia l’. In  a 
H eideggerian  m anner we could also investigate th e  n a tu re  o f  o u r  aesthetic  
cu ltu re  th ro u g h  a study o f o u r ‘a e s th e tic  e x is te n tia l’; a n d  vice versa by 
exploring the aesthetic culture we throw light on  ourselves as entities existing 
in  this cu ltu re .8
I have been  talking ab o u t ‘aesthetic cu ltu re ’. I u n d e rs ta n d  the  w ord 
‘cu ltu re’ as synonymous with the word ‘w orld’, so, we can use the expression, 
‘aesthetic w orld’. This raises fu rther H eideggerian  points. H e id eg g er writes 
ab o u t the world and  its relation to en tities w ithin it as follows:
The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so 
determinative for such entities that only in so far as ‘there is’ a world 
can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as 
entities which have been discovered. But in what way ‘is there’ a world?
If Dasein is ontically constituted by Being-in-the-World, and if an 
understanding of the Being of its Self belongs just as essentially to its 
Being ... then does not Dasein have an understanding of the world -  
a pre-ontological understanding, which indeed can and does get along 
without explicit ontological insights? With those entities which are
7 In Bdngand Time Heidegger defines ‘thrownness’: »This characteristic of Dasein’s Being
-  this ‘that it is’ -  is veiled in its ‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the 
more unveiledly; we call it the ‘thrownness' of this entity into its ‘there’; indeed, it is 
thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the ‘there’.« (174)
8 This reciprocity has important consequences for many traditional problems in 
aesthetics, for example interpretation; see Arto Haapala, »Interpretation, Context, 
and the Ethics of Interpretation -  An Essay in Existential Aesthetics«, in Interpretation 
and Its Boundaries (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 1999), edited by Arto Haapala 
and Ossi Naukkarinen, 162-176.
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encountered within-the-world -  that is to say, with their character as 
within-the-world -  does not something like the world show itself for 
the concernful Being-in-the-world?'J
H um ans as en tities existing in the world are constitu ted  by being-in- 
the-aesthetic-w orld . A nd  in  so far as we have been  acq u a in ted  w ith the 
aesthetic  w orld, we have also developed a pre-ontological u nderstand ing  of 
its structures. As we are dealing  with or taking care of the entities existing in 
the  aesthetic  w orld -  works o f art, buildings, design objects, natural objects 
an d  landscapes -  we are  a t the  sam e tim e necessarily taking care o f the 
aesthetic  w orld, a lth o u g h  the world itself is n o t an ob ject or event in  the 
sam e sense as en tities within-the-world. The aesthetic world is indeed  the 
precond ition  o f any aesthetic object and event, but at the same time the world 
w ould  n o t ex ist w ith o u t its objects. T he w orld m akes ind iv idual things 
possible, an d  it can exist and  m anifest itself only through these entities. This 
is also tru e  fo r the  strand  o f  h um an  existence I have called the ‘aesthetic 
ex isten tia l’: th e re  is a m utual depen d en ce  between this aspect o f hum an 
being  and  the aesthetic  world.
I have so far deliberately  avoided the expression ‘a rt w orld’, and  used 
instead the b ro ad er expression ‘aesthetic w orld’. Worlds o f  a r t -  music, visual 
arts, literature, film, theatre, etc. -  are paradigm atic examples o f the aesthetic 
world. M any o f o u r aesthetic practises have been  established in one art form 
o r an o th er, an d  the practices vary dep en d in g  on the e ra  and  the art form. 
Visual arts in  th e  M iddle Ages were very d ifferen t com pared  to now. T he 
observations I have m ade o f  the aesthetic world apply to the a rt w orld as 
well. But I would like to b roaden  the scope because my concerns in this essay 
are mainly ab o u t non-artistic objects. However, I do no t deny the significance 
an d  in fluence o f  a rt on  o u r aesthetic culture as a whole.
I l l
I have now  estab lished  the foundation  o f our aesthetic  cu lture , and 
show n som e o f the  com plicated  relations there  are betw een the aesthetic 
world, aesthetic objects and  hum an existence. Let me now turn  to the concept 
o f  place. T he co n cep t has becom e com m on and  popu lar in recen t analysis 
o f the  h u m an  env ironm ent. I t is w orth no ting  that H eidegger’s writings on 
‘d w e llin g ’ have in sp ired  n u m ero u s  w riters .10 R ather th an  going  in to  a
9 Heidegger, op. cit., 102.
10See Edward Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion Limited, 1976), 17-18, 37-41; 
Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place -  Toward a Renewed Understanding o f the Place-
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discussion o f the concep t o f place, let m e simply stipu late a m ean in g  for the 
term . This will allow m e to clarify its re la tionsh ip  to the  aesthetic  w orld and  
o u r ex p e rien ce  o f  aesthe tic  objects. T his will in  tu rn  p ro v id e  a p a th  to  
considering  how aesthetic and  ethics co incide in  this contex t.
W hen writing this essay at my office I have a place. I occupy a place in 
the straigh t forward physical sense: I am  sitting in  my chair, w hich is in  my 
office, w hich is in a building, etc. B ut I am  n o t in te re sted  in the  C artesian 
sense -  as H eidegger calls it -  o f an  ob ject and  its place in  the  world. n I do  
n o t w ant to define place in term s o f a fixed space so th a t a ce rta in  space o r 
spaces w o u ld  be n ecessary  fo r my p lace . I have  a p lace  in  th e  m o re  
sophisticated  sense o f the word. I have a place in the  sense th a t I have a 
re lationship  to hum ans, to d ifferent things an d  events a ro u n d  m e. My place 
is m eaningful and significant for m e because 1 have construed  d iffe ren t kinds 
o f relations to entities su rround ing  me. I have fam iliarised m yself with the 
im m ediate surroundings o f my office. M ost o f  the things inside the  office 
a re  ‘ready-to-hand’ — they are th e re  fo r m e so th a t I can  use them . T h e  
com puter, te lephone and all the books an d  papers are fam iliar to m e, w ithin 
my reach, an d  I see them  as entities w hich exist fo r my pu rp o ses.12 B ut also 
the view from  the window, the co rrido r b eh in d  my office door, the  d iffe ren t 
rou tes I take to the office, the lec tu re  halls in w hich I teach , these  also 
constitu te  my place. I create a place for m yself w ithin the  stru c tu res o f  a 
cultural world by connecting different sorts o f  ties to d ifferent sorts o f entities. 
My place has m ore or less perm anen t features to w hich I re tu rn  alm ost every 
day, like my hom e and  my office.
In the existential sense tha t I w ant to define it, place is, thus, the for- 
m e-significant-and-m eaningful-collection-of-entities. I am  using  th e  w ord  
‘entity’ broadly to cover no t only physical tilings, b u t also all kinds o f cultural 
objects an d  events, such as d ifferen t organisations an d  institu tions, cu ltu ra l 
practices an d  conventions, b u t also o th e r h u m an  beings who are  defined  by 
their relations to entities which are significant and  m eaningful to them . W orld 
is the historically structu red  foundation  th a t gives us en tities with m ean in g  
and  value; place is a selection o f d ifferen t culturally m eaningfu l entities th a t 
are significant for particu lar individuals because o f  th e ir actions, interests, 
or anything that has an influence on  th e ir evaluations an d  decisions.
World. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 109-145. I have 
analysed the concept of place in more detail in my ‘On the Aesthetics of the Everyday
-  Familiarity, Strangeness and the Meaning of Place”, forthcoming in Philosophy and 
Geography, Vol. IV: Aesthetics of Everyday Life, 1999.
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IV
Now we have a view to the  basic ontological s tructu re o f the world and  
h u m an s w ithin it in term s o f aesthetic w orld and  place. W here does the 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een  aesthetics and ethics com e in? T h e  idea o f aesthetic 
cu ltu re  already raises the basic issues in aesthetics, such as aesthetic value. 
L et m e look a t th e  status o f aesthetic values w ithin th e  aesthetic world and 
p ro ceed  in this way to the m ore general problem s of values and  evaluation.
O u r aesthetic culture is deeply m arked by values; the structures defining 
o u r aesthetic  existential an d  from  which all aesthetic objects are b o rn  are 
value-laden. T h e  ro le  o f values is m anifested very clearly in pieces tha t are 
reg ard ed  as classics -  a classic is by definition valuable in  som e respect. In 
the arts in particu lar, classics are defined within a period  o r style. J .S. B ach’s 
pieces are classics w ithin the  corpus o f baroque music; Tolstoy’s novels are 
classics w ithin the canon  o f Russian literature. The crite ria  o f goodness in 
B ach’s m usic an d  in Tolstoy’s novels differ understandably  to a g reat ex ten t 
a lread y  because m usic an d  lite ra tu re  appeal to d iffe ren t aspects o f  o u r 
ex istence, m usic m ore o ften  to our em otions, lite ra tu re  to o u r cognitive 
faculties. T o be a real classic, the piece m ust go beyond its original context; 
Bach is clearly n o t lim ited  to the Baroque, b u t to the  whole trad ition  of 
W estern  music. As G adam er puts it:
...w hen we call som eth ing  classical, there is a consciousness of 
som ething enduring, of significance that cannot be lost and that is 
independent of all circumstances of time -  a kind of timeless present 
that is contemporaneous with every other present.'3
I shall, however, co n cen tra te  here  on the m ore personal side o f our 
ae s th e tic  eva lua tions. Jo se p h  M argolis has m ade a d is tin c tio n  betw een 
‘appreciative ju d g m en ts ’ and  ‘findings’. W hen talking abou t ‘findings’ there 
is a widely accep ted  set o f norm s to which one refers in justifying a claim, 
w hereas in appreciativejudgm ents personal preferences, o r ‘taste’ as he calls 
it, have a ro le  to play. H e writes:
... findings obtain where some set of the actual properties of an object 
are, on a theory, taken to be sufficient for the ascription of a certain 
value; the informality with which such properties may be specified does 
not affect the logical status of findings. But appreciativejudgments 
obtain  w here, precisely, the actual (the minimally describable) 
properties of an object are ‘filtered’ through the personal tastes and
“ Heidegger, ibid., 122-134.
12This is Heidegger’s ‘ Umsicht’, Sein und Zeit, 69; in English translation, ‘circumspection’, 
B ein g a n d  Time, 98.
13Gadamer, op. cit., 288.
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sensibilities of the agent of judg ing ; there , no set o f the actual 
properties of an object are sufficient to justify the ascription of the 
relevant value. Hence, on an appropriate theory, we say that an object 
has a certain value (findings) or one is justified only in ascribing a certain 
value to that object (appreciativejudgm ents).14
I am interested in appreciativejudgm ents ra ther than  findings. A finding 
is a ju d g m e n t abou t a constitutive featu re  w ithin the aesthetic  w orld -  like 
»Bach’s ‘M atthew  P assion’ has g rea t artis tic  (o r a e s th e tic ) m erit«  -  an  
appreciative ju d g m en t says m ore ab o u t the  speaker — »Finnish landscapes 
in the  w in te r are very ca lm ing  a n d  b eau tifu l« . B u t b o th  fin d in g s  a n d  
a p p re c ia t iv e ju d g m e n ts  p lay a ro le  in  a e s th e tic s ; in  M a rg o lis ’s view 
»appreciative m atters dom inate ... in the  aesthetic  d o m ain « .15
W hat is it that makes some aesthetic objects m ore significant for us than  
others? Why is it th a t certain  works speak to us m ore  th an  others? T h e re  
are cases in which we acknowledge the  value o f  a piece, it m ay even be  a 
classic, and still we cannot enjoy it. This does n o t have to be a case o f ‘aesthetic 
acrasia’, i.e. that we can n o t enjoy the aesthetic value o f a p iece because o f 
som e kind o f personal defect in us. I w ant to look  at cases w here we are  able 
to create a particularly deep  relation  to an  aesthetic  object. T hese kinds o f 
bonds are, I think, often based in particu la r characteristics o f o u r place.
I can develop a taste for certain  kinds o f  a r t by systematically studying 
a particu lar style and getting m ore an d  m ore fam iliar with the  featu res th a t 
constitute it. O r I may develop a taste unknowingly, for exam ple w hen living 
in a p a r tic u la r  en v iro n m e n t, be it ru ra l  o r  u rb a n , a n d  I m ay s ta r t  to  
appreciate that particular environm ent o r that k ind  o f m ilieu m ore generally. 
I m ight begin to feel attached to particular kinds o f aesthetic objects. Because 
o f my place and the ‘ho rizo n ’ that is c reated  by it, I have an  affinity with 
certain  kinds of aesthetic objects. Som e o f these affinities a re  based o n  very 
fundam ental hum an existentials: to be a m an o r to be a wom an clearly shapes 
different kinds of affinities. These prim ary divisions are, however, m ade m ore 
com plicated by num erous o th er factors th a t define h u m an  existence -  all 
the cu ltural aspects tha t are essential for the  h u m an  way o f being, as well as 
the personal aspects o f individuals living an d  acting  in a cu lture .
Place is, indeed , the  horizon  th a t  d e te rm in e s  o u r p e rcep tio n s  an d  
preferences. G adam er defines ‘h o rizo n ’ in this way:
Every finite present has its lim itations. We define the concept of 
‘situation’ by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the 
possibility of vision. Hence the essential concept of situation is the
14 Joseph Margolis, Art and Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989), 
223-224.
15 Margolis, ibid., 224.
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concept of ‘horizon’. The horizon is the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying 
this to the thinking mind, we speak of the narrowness of horizon, of 
the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening of new horizons, 
and so forth.1'’
O u r places an d  horizons are by no m eans fixed, on  the contrary, the 
existential an d  h istoricist concep tion  o f h um an  existence I have developed 
is very explicit ab o u t the  possibility o f change. But it is also an  existential 
fact th a t the range o f choices dim inishes in the course o f time -  my existence 
is by now  m uch  m ore d e te rm in ed  than  twenty years ago. It is this construal 
o f o n e ’s existence th a t limits o u r choices and  decides o u r preferences.
T h e  co n n e c tio n  b etw een  a place an d  aesthetics is, however, m ore  
co m p lica ted  th an  that. T h e re  is a tendency  to feel affinity to som eth ing  
fam iliar th a t is p a r t o f  o n e ’s own existence, b u t one o f the striving forces 
b eh in d  d iffe ren t developm ents in W estern art is the search for som ething 
new. In  the  visual arts this tendency  has been  very clear, and  it reveals the 
o th e r  side to aesthetics -  the values innovativeness an d  strangeness. In the 
co n tem p o rary  arts, the  uncanny  and  the shocking have played a significant 
role. By contrast, in everyday surroundings strangeness has had a significantly 
m in o r role, n o t only in the aesthetics o f natu ra l environm ents b u t also in 
u rb an  settings. A lthough  one  can p o in t ou t singular exam ples o f striking 
build ings and  b u ilt areas, as well as spectacular natural scenes, it is still true 
to say, th a t generally  speaking strangeness does n o t have such im portance 
in en v ironm en ta l aesthetics.
In the ‘aesthetics o f p lace’ I am pu tting  em phasis on those aspects of 
aesthetics w here fam iliarity ra th e r than  strangeness dom inate. My place is 
d ea r to m e because it is p a rt o f my existence. All features o f  o n e ’s place do 
n o t have to be beautifu l in any strong or definite sense o f the word, bu t there 
is a tendency  to value them  positively. T he relation betw een a person and 
en tities constitu ting  his o r h e r  place is an affectionate one; when we are in 
c o n s tan t co n tac t with o u r  su rro u n d in g s and  have c rea ted  o u r very own 
p e rso n a l ties to  it, it b eco m es so m eth in g  to w hich we c a n n o t have an 
in d iffe ren t attitude. O u r place is too close to us for us to have any distance 
from  it.
As I have tried  to  show above, this closeness is ontological in nature: is 
n o t  so m e th in g  in d e p e n d e n t  from  us b u t precisely th e  p erso n al in o u r 
existence. This m eans tha t there can be tensions and contradictions between 
a p e rs o n ’s aesth e tic  p re fe ren ces and  m ore generally  accep ted  aesthetic  
standards. A su b u rb an  area  can be very d ea r to som ebody who has lived
"’Gadamer, op. cit., 302.
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there  d u rin g  his or h e r ch ildhood  even th o u g h  an ou tsid er w ould estim ate 
its aesthetic value to be very low. We gain satisfaction th ro u g h  a k in d  o f  
com forting security: the aesthetic p leasure o f  place is based on  the  fact th a t 
we know it so well; it is som ething we can trust; it is n o t th rea ten in g ; it does 
question o u r preferences, values o r indeed , existence.
Even the ugly aspects o f o n e ’s p lace -  ugly again by som e cu lturally  
defined standards -  gain som e aesthetic value. T hey may co n trib u te  to the  
stability an d  com fort that is essential in place. An old pair o f  shoes may be 
repulsive to som eone who does no t know their history and  has n o t used them . 
For the owner, they are bo th  fam iliar an d  com fortab le, and  it is in this th a t 
their aesthetic value lies. This does n o t m ean, however, th a t we p re fe r no  
changes to o u r surroundings. We may well be willing to allow even m ajor 
modifications if the surroundings are aesthetically, socially, o r in som e o th e r 
respects defective. T he po in t I am m aking is tha t being  p art o f a place im bues 
every entity with value for a person.
This value can be understood  also in ethical term s: my place defines 
my way o f existing and  any change in  the  place has som e consequences fo r 
my existence. Let m e take an ex trem e exam ple to illustra te  these  m oral 
im plications. It is m orally wrong to m ove p eop le  from  an  area  w ith o u t a 
com pelling reason. A com pelling reason  cou ld  be, for exam ple , th a t th e re  
is som ething poisonous in the area that constitutes a hea lth  hazard  to people 
living there. There could be o ther com pelling reasons, b u t for my a rg u m en t 
it is n o t necessary to define as what constitu tes a com pelling  reason.
It is clear th a t there  are reasons w hich are n o t com pelling  from  the  
po in t o f view o f those living there. To force peop le  to m ove because o f  th e ir 
race or age, is, generally speaking, m orally w rong, a lth o u g h  th ere  m igh t be 
singular cases and contexts in which even such actions cou ld  be  justified . 
W ith re cen t shocking cases o f  e thn ic  cleansing  in Yugoslavia, it becom es 
obvious tha t the argum ents used by all parties o f the conflict are o f the  form  
that a particular area is an essential p a rt o f a n a tio n ’s identity. T h e  reference 
is to larger cultural structures that then  serve as a g round  for the constitu tion  
o f individual places, and  in this way are also parts o f places. So th e re  is a 
very deep  existential and  m oral d im ension  in the co n cep t o f place.
У
T he existential, the m oral, and  the  aesthetic  aspects are  in tertw ined  
to g e th e r  in  co m p lica ted  ways. My ju d g m e n ts  a b o u t  my p lace  a re  n o t 
objective, b u t necessarily ‘b ia sed ’. My p lace  has ae s th e tic  value sim ply
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because I am  existentially tied to it, and  through  this existential connection  
I am  a ttach ed  to it em otionally  too. I t has ethical value because it is a t the 
h ea rt o f  my existence and  a changing o f it would affect my existence. Entities 
in my place are, in a way, p a r t o f m e, and so I tend see them  as beautiful 
an d  w orth  preserving. O nce again I have to stress that this is a tendency, n o t 
a genera l ru le. We can each p o in t o u t things constitu ting o u r place tha t we 
w ould ra th e r rep lace with som eth ing  else. It m ight be a bu ild ing style we do 
n o t like, o r  it  m ig h t be  som eth ing  m ore abstract, like an  institu tion  o r a 
custom  th a t goes against o u r nature .
L et m e finally draw  som e conclusions regarding judgm ents abou t the 
env ironm en t. If my existential analysis is on the righ t track, th ere  seem  to 
be two very d iffe ren t sorts o f  value judgm ents. W hen I am  talking abou t my 
c lo sest e n v iro n m e n t, a b o u t  so m eth in g  th a t co n stitu te s  my p lace , my 
ju d g m e n ts  a re  d eriv ed  from  my very own ex isten tia l co n stitu en ts , an d  
accordingly  they are very m uch  abou t myself. They do n o t say m uch abou t 
the en v iro n m en t as such, b u t ra th e r abou t a possible way o f life. For a New 
Yorker the  city o f New York is the familiar su rround ing  which exem plifies 
n u m ero u s positive qualities: it is rich and  exciting, m aybe som etim es even 
cosy an d  hom ely. For an  ou tsider New York may appear as th rea ten in g  and  
hostile. T hese  judgm ents stem  from  very differen t g rounds, d ifferen t ways 
o f life constitu ting  d iffe ren t horizons. They are both  genu ine and  in their 
own contexts acceptab le verdicts. But because o f their incom patib le points 
o f  d ep a rtu re , they ca n n o t be placed on  same scale. T hey address d ifferen t 
p laces. T his is M argo lis’s app recia tive  ju d g m en t: tak ing  p leasu re  from  
m atch in g  o n e ’s way o f life with the surroundings or displeasure from  the 
lack o f such m atching.
B ut our value judgm ents about the environm ent are no t always subjective 
in this sense. T h ere  are culturally accepted values the validity o f which is 
n o t d e p e n d e n t o n  any individual preferences. Classics are parad igm atic  
exam ples o f this, an d  th e re  are classics in all fields o f culture. Also, many 
na tu ra l scenes have gained  the status o f a classic, for exam ple N iagara Falls 
o r the Rocky M ountains. Classics exemplify certain values and  they m aintain 
these values. Value ju d g m en ts  in this sense are in a cultural sphere. Cultural 
entities exist w ithin a cu lture, and  this goes for cultural values too. Som eone 
m ay n o t like B ach’s m usic, b u t this does no t deny its cultural value. To do 
the  la tte r w ould only show ignorance of our m usic culture.
B oth cu ltu ra l values an d  o u r personal p references, bo th  w orld and  
place, are ro o ted  in o u r existence. They determ ine w hat we are and  how 
we view th ings aro u n d . This also m eans tha t goodness an d  beauty go h an d  
in  hand : the way I am  in the world is both  an ethical and  aesthetic issue.
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T he determ ining grounds and character o f my place are o f u tm ost im portance 
for m e in  every sense o f the word because these are m atters th a t constitu te  
what, as a hum an being, I finally am. Place is n o t an  im perative, it is ra th e r  
an  exem plification of certain choices an d  decisions th a t a particu la r h u m an  
being has m ade, and  tha t fu rth e r constitu te  this p a rticu la r individual as a 
hum an  being. These are the origins o f  h u m an  existence as a cu ltu ra l entity  
and  as an  individual with distinctive features d istinguishing h im  o r h e r  from  
o th e r hum ans.
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